主管单位:中国科学技术协会
主办单位:中国地理学会
承办单位:华东师范大学

World Regional Studies ›› 2023, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (2): 1-11.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-9479.2023.02.2020663

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On the leadership of great power in regional economic cooperation: Theory, case and implications

Yahua MA1,2(), Debin DU2,3()   

  1. 1.School of Business and Finance, Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai 200234, China
    2.a Institute for World Geography and Geostrategy,
    3.b Institute for Global Innovation and Development, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China
  • Received:2020-09-22 Revised:2021-07-23 Online:2023-02-15 Published:2023-02-24
  • Contact: Debin DU

论大国在区域经济合作中的领导作用:理论、经验与启示

马亚华1,2(), 杜德斌2,3()   

  1. 1.上海师范大学商学院,上海 200234
    2.华东师范大学,世界地理与地缘战略研究中心,上海 200062
    3.华东师范大学,全球创新与发展研究院,上海 200062
  • 通讯作者: 杜德斌
  • 作者简介:马亚华(1969—),副教授,主要从事区域经济学和世界经济学研究,E-mail:yhma@shnu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA087)

Abstract:

Because of state actor's bounded rationality,regional integration for institutional cooperation usually encounter double troubles in treaty making and compliance. But in a regional system with a heterogeneous distribution of power, countries participating in collective negotiation for integration will differentiate into three kind including leader(s), followers and free riders, in which the great power seeking leadership will offer credible deterrence to free-riding and treachery by small countries. So the authority of the treaty can be guaranteed. This paper will demonstrate the logic of great power's leadership and the unbalanced approach of regional integration by means of theoretical and empirical research after set up a model of heterogeneous collective activity and a model of social action. Conclusions in this paper can inspire China to participate regional integration and make geopolitical strategy effectively.

Key words: regional economic cooperation, international leader, collective activity, free riding, credible deterrence

摘要:

由于国家行为体的有限理性,以制度性合作为目标的区域一体化通常会遇到立约和遵约的双重难题。但在一个权力和利益异质分布的区域体系内,参与合作谈判的国家会因实力差异而分化成领导者、追随者和搭车者三种类型,其中作为领导者的大国能够通过发出可信威胁来改变小国策略空间,对搭车和背约等机会主义行为进行制约,从而降低达成协议的难度并有效维护协议的权威性。本文通过建立一个异质性集体行动分析框架,借助社会行动理论模型,从规范和经验两个层面论证了一体化在功能上依赖大国领导以及在空间上遵循非均衡发展路径的现实逻辑,所得结论对中国在东亚区域经济合作中进行准确定位乃至在国际地缘战略制定中或许有着启示作用。

关键词: 区域经济合作, 国际领导, 集体行动, 搭便车, 可信威慑